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As an historian, I am obligated to point out that 
technology did not progress very rapidly for most 
of man’s history. Until the last two centuries, tech­
nology developed irregularly and at so slow a pace 
that, for most of human history, the mass of man­
kind lived in a world of scarcity and deprivation. 
The Industrial Revolution ushered in an era of rap­
id technological advance. In accelerating measure 
since then, technological developments have in­
creased man’s control over his environment, minis­
tered to his animal needs and creature comforts, 
rescued him from the ever-present fear of star­
vation, increased his mobility, lengthened his life­
span, and, in general, made work easier and life 
more comfortable for most of the population in 
the industrialized nations of the world.
Man’s technical progress in the nineteenth cen­
tury was dramatic; in the first seven decades of the 
twentieth century it has been spectacular. At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, men could 
travel only as fast as a horse or sailing vessel could 
carry them, and these speeds had not increased sig­
nificantly across the centuries. By 1900 the rail­
road was moving men across land at speeds up to 
70 miles an hour, and steamships moved faster 
and more surely than the swiftest of clipper ships. 
In 1800 a man’s voice could be heard only by those 
within shouting distance; by 1900 the telegraph and 
the telephone were carrying the human voice across 
continents. In 1800, when a man died, his voice and 
actions were buried with him; in 1900 the phono­
graph and the newly invented motion picture ma­
chine recorded him for posterity. In 1800 most A- 
mericans went to bed at dusk or perhaps stayed 
up a few hours later to read by the light of the fire­
place or of flickering candles; by 1900 sundown 
did not mean bedtime, for there were gaslights, 
newfangled electric lights, and in the remote coun­
tryside, kerosene lamps to illuminate the darkness. 
The progress of mechanization in the nineteenth 
century had relieved man from many backbreaking 
tasks on the farm and in the factories, and had enor­
mously increased the output of manufactured goods.
Given this record of past performance, it is not 
surprising that men in the year 1900 looked back 
with satisfaction over what had been accomplished 
during the preceding century and looked forward 
with blithe confidence and naive hope that techno­
logy would do still more for them in the century 
to come. Bearing a faith which might be termed 
«industrial humanism», they expected that the tech­
nological revolution in production and distri­
bution would bring a brave new world into being.
— Paper first presented at: Symposium on the Problems 
of Economic Growth, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Penn­
sylvania. October 17-19, 1972.
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Poverty would be abolished; technology’s benefits 
would spread worldwide to do away with misery and 
insecurity and hence with class and international 
warfare.
Well, a funny thing happened on the way to Utopia. 
Here we are three-quarters of the way through 
the twentieth century, and the promises of social 
betterment, world peace, and material progress have 
not yet materialized. But we cannot blame technolo­
gy for all that went wrong. Indeed, technology more 
than made good on its promises of quickened trans­
portation and communication, of new sources of 
energy, and of more material goods and comforts.
But the social promise held forth by an advancing 
technology did not materialize. I think that is large­
ly because we utilized our technology in the con- 
tex of an old economy of scarcity, with values and 
institutions which had been made obsolete by scien­
tific and technological developments. Social benefits 
were achieved, to be sure, but not to the extent pos­
sible if we had renovated our institutions and values 
by social innovations to accompany, and perhaps 
point the way for, our technological prowess.
In light of our recent record, «can technological 
progress continue to provide for the future?» My 
answer to this question is yes. Technological advance 
can, will, and must provide for the future economic 
growth which is necessary to meet the needs and 
wants of our American society and of people through­
out the world. But, as we shall see, this technologi­
cal advance must be guided by social controls which 
will enable us to employ our technology more effec­
tively. These social controls will arise from new 
institutions, new values, and new mechanisms which 
now exist in embryonic form.
Not everyone would agree with my optimistic 
view regarding future growth. At the beginning of 
1972 thirty-three British scientists published «Α 
Blueprint for Survival» in The Ecologist,1 in which 
they warned that an ecological breakdown was im­
minent unless population growth, the demand on 
resources, and economic growth were brought to a 
quick halt. Although concentrating on the British 
situation, the blueprint was directed at worldwide 
problems and it was a thoroughgoing indictment of 
current technological and social trends which, they 
claimed, were leading the world to the brink of envi­
ronmental disaster.
Only a month later the British scientific doomsayers 
were reinforced in their prophecies by an internation­
al group of systems analysts based at ΜΓΓ whose 
study of world trends concluded that society prob­
ably faces an uncontrollable and disastrous col­
1. «Α Blueprint for Survival», The Ecologist (London), Jan. 
1972.
lapse within one hundred years unless it moves 
quickly to establish a «global equilibrium» in which 
growth of population and industrial output are 
halted. Peering into the future by building a mathe­
matical model of the world system, this study exam­
ined the highly complex interrelations among pop­
ulations, food supply, natural resources, pollution, 
and industrial production. The Limits to Growth,* 
as the preliminary study is called, argues that the 
limits to human population in relation to our planet’s 
finite resources are very near, and that the day of 
doom is virtually upon us.
This MIT study, which forms part of the Club 
of Rome’s «Project on the Predicament of Mankind» 
—a study whose title almost dictates what the re­
sults will be—concludes that if we let things go 
on as they have been, there will be a precipitous drop 
in population before the year 2100, presumably 
through disease and starvation, and the complete 
breakdown of our industrial society.
Frightened and impressed as I am by the pre­
dictions of my colleagues engaged in this game of 
systems analysis, I still remain an historian. Hence 
1 tend to view all such predictions and projections 
in the light of historical perspective.
Let us remember what Ralph Walso Emerson 
said in his famous Phi Beta Kappa speech at Har­
vard more than a century ago, when he gave this 
advice to the American scholar in times of crisis: 
«Let him not quit his belief that a popgun is a pop­
gun, though the ancient and the honorable of the 
earth affirm it to be the crack of doom.»
In trying to determine whether this is merely 
the snap of a popgun or a crack of doom I have 
the feeling that we have heard the same arguments 
before. I derive solace from the fact that people have 
been crying «Wolf!» for many years, and the wolf 
did not arrive on the scene. Almost two centuries 
ago, Thomas Robert Malthus theorized that popu­
lation grew geometrically while food supply grew 
arithmetically, so that population would soon out­
strip available food supply. Malthus proved to 
be wrong because he did not foresee the Industrial 
Revolution, which was just getting started in Brit­
ain at that time, and the concomitant transformation 
in agricultural production.
In the twentieth century the neo-Malthusians 
arose once again to challenge the ability of technolo­
gical advancement to meet the material needs of the 
world’s population. Only half a dozen years ago 
there were dire predictions of global starvation be­
cause of the apparent inability to increase agricul-
2. Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Ran- 
ders, and William W. Behrens III, The Limits to Growth. A 
Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament 
of Mankind (New York, 1972).
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turai production in relation to the exploding popu­
lations. A headline of November 6, 1966 in The New 
York Times read as follows: «Half the World Is 
Hungry, and Worse Is to Come», and the article, 
by no less an authority than Drew Middleton, usually 
a calm and judicious correspondent, predicted that 
1985 might well see «man’s greatest crisis, a crisis 
arising out of his failure to perform an elementary 
task-feeding himself». A book published by Wil­
liam and Paul Paddock in the following year was en­
titled Famine-1975 ! America’s Decision: Who
Will Survive?1 The grim solution offered by the Pad- 
dock brothers ran along desperate lines: the devel­
oped nations would have to establish a rank order 
list of priorities among the hungry nations to de­
cide which should be given food and technical help 
to become self-sufficient countries; the rest were 
to be abandoned to starvation. In effect, their solu­
tion was to have the industrially advanced nations 
determining which people of the world would sur­
vive.
But the new-Malthusians were again confounded. 
A great transformation, the Green Revolution, 
by introducing recently developed high-yield va­
rieties of rice and wheat offered new hope to devel­
oping nations. New strains of rice and wheat were 
introduced in the mid-1960s, and by the end of 
1966 a production explosion had occurred in the 
grain bowls of the world. The Philippines, which 
had imported one million tons of rice annually, 
became self-sufficient; by 1970, India’s wheat pro­
duction had risen 50 percent, and Ceylon’s rice crop 
had increased 34 percent. In Mexico, wheat yields, 
which averaged about 500 pounds per acre in 1950, 
advanced to 2300. Japan, long an importer of rice, 
produced a huge surplus.
Such evidence does not make the purveyors of 
doom change their minds; it merely makes them 
change their arguments. While grudgingly admitting 
that the spectre of mass starvation has been avert­
ed, at least temporarily, the doom-sayers point 
to the harmful ecological side-effects of the Green 
Revolution. Growing the new rice and wheat crops 
requires large amounts of fertilizer and pesticides, 
with consequent environmental pollution on a mas­
sive scale. We have merely exchanged the imme­
diate problem of mass starvation, they say, for the 
long-range problem of death to humans and other 
living creatures by destruction of the environment.
Despite the familiarity of their gloomy prophecies, 
we cannot dismiss the warnings of the Club of Rome 
lightly. Just because the Malthusians and neo-Mal- 
thusians proved wrong in the past does not mean
1. William Paddock and Paul Paddock, Famine-1975! Ame­
rica's Decision·. Who Will Survive? (New York, 1967).
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that they might not be correct now in their fore­
bodings. If we compare them to the boy in the fable 
who cried «Wolf!» we must remember that at the 
end of that story, the wolf finally did come and 
made a clean sweep of the lambs. In other words, 
this might not be another false alarm; this might 
be the real thing.
Meadows and his associates claim that it is the 
real thing, and they proclaim a sense of urgency. 
The reason for their concern stems, I think, from 
the fact that they are experts in the computer sciences; 
hence they understand the implications of exponent­
ial growth. They recognize how, as population and 
per capita consumption grow, the demand curve 
suddenly zooms upward.
I can share their concern about the finitude of 
our planet’s resources in relation to continued growth, 
but I cannot share their alarm. From the perspec­
tive of history, I can see no cases where exponential 
growth continued to such extremes that the entire 
system broke down.
I am not opposed to the employment of statis­
tical data in historical interpretation; I applaud its 
use, especially in a systems analysis which recog­
nizes the interrelatedness of many different factors 
with the feedbacks operating among them.
In brief, I am greatly in favor of the systems anal­
ysis methodology used by the study group of the 
Club of Rome,2 and I hope that it can be extended 
and refined to increase our understanding of yester­
day, today, and tomorrow. Nevertheless, as an his­
torian concerned with the complex murkiness of 
human affairs, I find some major omissions and 
deficiencies in their systems diagnosis and their 
«no-growth» prescription.
One obvious deficiency in an analysis which 
relies wholly upon statistics is the fact that we don’t 
have sufficient data about enough things to give 
us a complete picture of what is happening in the 
world. Life and society occur in a four dimensional 
continuum, whereas statistics provide us only with a 
partial, two-dimensional picture of human activ­
ities. Economists have sometimes become so enam­
ored with numbers that they disregard the facts 
behind the figures and hence are blind to the so­
cial components of the economic changes which 
they believe they are measuring.
John Clapham,3 the great economic historian,
2. See The Limits to Growth (fn. 2), pp. 20-23; see also 
Jay W. Forrester, World Dynamics (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). 
For a critique of the methodology, see H. S. D. Cole, Chris­
topher Freeman, Marie Jahoda, and K.L.R. Pavitt (eds.), 
Models of Doom'. A Critique of The Limits to Growth (New 
York, 1973; published in Great Britain, 1973, under the title 
Thinking About the Future), particularly pp. 14-32, 108-34.
3. J.H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and 
Germany, 1815-1914 (14th edn., Cambridge, 1936), and Clap-
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skillfully employed production figures in analyzing 
the economic growth of Western Europe during 
the nineteenth century. Bedazzled—and perhaps 
misled—by his carefully constructed statistical
syntheses, Clapham achieved the tour-de-force of 
writing the economic history of France and Brit­
ain during the nineteenth century without even 
mentioning the term «Industrial Revolution».
Clapham’s myopic view of industrialization still 
persists. In a recent seminar discussion I happened 
to mention the phrase «Industrial Revolution». 
One of academia’s most respected statistical eco­
nomists chided me for using the term, pointing out 
that production figures for Britain in the century 
1760-1860 rose only a few percentage points; 
this, he said, could scarcely be considered revo­
lutionary. I am certain that his statistics were cor­
rect, but I am equally convinced that his conclusion 
was faulty. For the fact remains that in 1760 the great 
bulk of Englishmen lived and worked as had their 
ancestors for thousands of years previously; the 
hearth and home were the centers of production, 
and men lived in small rural communities with agri­
culture as their chief occupation. A hundred years 
later men had been wrenched from traditional modes 
of working and living; the factory had become the 
center of production, and men were dwelling in urban 
industrial town, not in rural agrarian villages. By 
almost every social and cultural index one might 
employ, the old way of life had been destroyed, and 
new values, institutions, and attitudes had come into 
being. I call that a revolution, and I call it an In­
dustrial Revolution because technological develop­
ments had brought about the industrialization of 
Britain and had wrought this great transformation 
in society and culture. By concentrating on only 
one set of economic indicators, our great aca­
demic statistician had lost sight of other factors 
which would have given him a truer view of what 
had actually occurred. Similarly, Robert Fogel,1 in 
his econometric analysis of the impact of railroads 
on American history, comes to the conclusion that 
they had very little effect, thereby ignoring their 
profound social and cultural and psychological im­
pact, as well as their effect on other industries 
and technologies.
My complaint against the MIT group is not that 
they used statistics incorrectly but that they were 
unhistorical, although they employed going back 
to 1900 in making up their statistical charts, and hence
ham, An Economic History of Modern Britain, 1820-1929 
(3 vols., 2nd edn., Cambridge, 1930-38).
1. Robert W. Fogel, Railroads and American Economic 
Growth: Essays in Econometric History (Baltimore, Md., 
1964).
their systems analysis omitted many parameters of 
the socio-economic impact of technological develop­
ments, as revealed by the history of technology.
Many of the elements which go into making up the 
technological dynamics of our industrial society can­
not be quantified or at least we have not yet found 
the way to measure them statistically. These include 
such things as changing value patterns which mo­
dify man’s technical choices; his technological crea­
tivity which will undoubtedly enable him to overcome 
the obstacles to growth; and the development of in­
stitutions for social control of technology that will 
allow us to avert breakdown and still have economic 
growth, a higher standard of living, and a cleaner en­
vironment, and that will improve the quality of life for 
all the world’s inhabitants for the foreseeable future. 
Let me be more specific.
First, the story of technology, beginning with the 
age of industrialism, convinces me that the no-growth 
formula ignores the historical evidence of man’s tech­
nical creativity. Meadows2 claims that a rise in in­
dustrial capacity, necessitated by a larger world po­
pulation demanding more goods, will bring about 
an exhaustion of natural resources; this will in turn 
force prices up, thereby leaving less money for rein­
vestment in the capital goods necessary to sustain our 
industrial base. The history of technology during the 
last two centuries, however, is the story of an expand­
ing natural resource base as industrial capacity 
expended. Two hundred years ago petroleum played 
no part among productive resources, and fifty years 
ago uranium was a mineral of interest only to a few 
laboratory scientists; but changing technology made 
both essential for new forms of energy. Twenty years 
ago the iron mines of the Upper Peninsula in Mi­
chigan and the Mesabi Range in Minnesota were con­
sidered played out; yet the development of proces­
ses for making taconite pellets economically has given 
them a new lease on life and created natural re­
sources out of what were once considered useless 
mine tailings.
Of course, the Meadows group will tell us that there 
is only a finite amount of petroleum resources and 
iron ore in the earth, and, despite recycling, it will 
not be sufficient to meet man’s growing needs. But 
this ignores the technologists’ demonstrated capabi­
lity for expanding the resource base and for finding 
substitutes. Indeed, a material which is coming 
increasingly into use in this connection is one of 
man’s oldest materials; wood, which is both re­
cyclable and a renewable natural resource.
I am also troubled by the fact that Meadows treats 
industrial production as a monolithic unit and tech-
2. Meadows, Limits to Growth, chs. 2,4.
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nology as static. But the industrial base can alter its 
components, and technology is a dynamic variable 
which might increase production without strain on 
resources and without increasing pollution, and at 
the same time meet the growing demands of a grow­
ing population.
The gloomy predictions of the Meadows analysis are 
produced by extrapolating the present rate of con­
sumption of resources by our present industrial sys­
tem. But suppose the industrial base alters as a result 
of technological advances making certain resources 
cheaper, developing processes for utilization of ma­
terials not now considered resources, and suppose all 
of this is done without any appreciable increase in 
pollution. We are in the process of doing that right 
now, and Meadows oversimplifies our industrial sys­
tem by thinking of it in unitary fashion without re­
cognizing that certain elements can be expanded at 
greater than the predicted rate without the dire results 
he predicts.
Let me give you an example of how the complex 
nature of our industrial system tends to blur the im­
pact of singular developments, revolutionary though 
they might he in one particular field, and, therefore, 
how Meadows’ simplified analysis can lead us astray. 
Some half dozen years ago, President Johnson set up 
a National Commission on Technology, Automation, 
and Economic Progress. There were dire predictions 
at the time that automation was eliminating 40,000 
jobs a week, or 2 million jobs a year, and that this 
situation would prevail for years to come. There was 
solid evidence for this view: a recently-introduced 
machine performed 500 manufacturing functions that 
formerly took 70 men to perform, and in another in­
dustrial installation, 48 men with automated equip­
ment replaced 400 men and turned out the same num­
ber of finished products in half the time. There is 
no doubt that computers result in startling gains in 
productivity when hitched to machines, and they do 
displace most of the workers formerly employed in 
those tasks. Nevertheless, the predictions about large- 
scale unemployment did not materialize. These pre­
dictions were based on statistics, but the statistics 
measured the wrong thing at the wrong time. The 
introduction of computer-operated devices in manu­
facturing processes was just beginning to gather 
momentum: the unemployment extrapolations were 
made on too small a base, and the impact of com­
puters on employment was blunted by the boom in 
other sectors of the economy. The fact is that 
it would have been impossible to separate the 
computer’s effects from those of other elements of 
accelerating industrialization going on at the same 
time.
Meadows, I think, makes his mistake in the oppo­
site direction; he fails to see how improved technical
162
means in certain sectors of industry can alter the 
very feedback systems upon which he relies so greatly. 
The Club of Rome study assumes that advancing 
industrial production necessarily results in greater 
pollution. This simply is not true. Newer machi­
nes and more sophisticated processes—a result of 
technological advance and, partially, of public pres­
sure against pollution—actually pollute less and pro­
duce more than do the older means. When the Environ­
mental Quality Control Act went into force, many 
industrialists complained that they would he forced 
out of business by strict enforcement of pollution 
standards or that the prices of their products would be 
so high that they could no longer compete effectively. 
It has not turned out that way, thereby showing the 
ingenuity of our corporate managers as well as of our 
engineers. True, some factories have had to close; 
but if the reports are correct, these were older plants 
which could no longer compete effectively. They have 
been replaced by new plants which can produce more 
efficiently and with less pollution. The point is that 
we are already making inroads against pollution while 
at the same time increasing production. And if prices 
have gone up, it is not because our resources are 
being depleted, as Meadows postulated, but because of 
inflationary pressures which have little to do with our 
technological base.
Despite growing industrial production, we are mak­
ing headway against pollution. For example, En­
gland has been so successful in its fight against 
pollution that certain fish and birds which had not 
been seen along the Thames River since the early part 
of the nineteenth century have reappeared. The air in 
certain American cities is getting cleaner—even in New 
York City. We are also learning that while Lake 
Erie might be dying, she is still not dead, and there 
are high hopes of scouring it out and making it 
fresh and clean again within the next two decades. In 
other words, some effects of pollution are not so 
irreversible as we once thought, as we gain more 
scientific knowledge and technical expertise.
Indeed, it is possible to make a strong case coun­
ter to the Meadows argument. That is, industrial 
growth rather than industrial no-growth is essential 
if we are to have sufficient natural resources in the 
future, if we are to do away with the pollution creat­
ed by the present state of society, and if we are to 
take care of the physical needs and creature comforts 
of the world’s growing population. In other words, 
if my historical analysis could be fed into a compu­
ter, it would lead to conclusions exactly the opposite 
of Meadow’s. The population-resource-pollution cri­
ses—which he claims can only be resolved by a stabili­
zation of industrial capacity and a sharp reduction 
in resource consumption—would actually lead me to 
the opposite conclusion, namely, that we must, by
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improved scientific technology, develop our resources 
base and promote our industrial capacity as nev­
er before.
But I digress. Let us return again to our critique 
of the Meadows analysis. It seems inconceivable to me 
that any attempt to deal with problems involving 
population growth, pollution, natural resources, in­
dustrial output, and food supply should not have con­
sidered energy as one of the major parameters in 
the systems under consideration. Yet I think that 
the MIT study dismissed energy in a most cavalier 
fashion.
At the turn of the century the great American his­
torian, Henry Adams, fascinated by recent develop­
ments in the field of physics, attempted to apply 
the second law of thermodynamics to human affairs. 
Using this false analogy, he came to the conclusion 
that civilization would ultimately break down, for our 
energy resources—which he also considered finite and 
irreplaceable—would be dissipated. He thought that 
our industrial society would founder about the middle 
of the twentieth century. Well, here we are well on 
our way in the third quarter of the century, and we 
are still going strong. Instead of having less energy 
at our disposal than before, we have an almost un­
limited amount available through our capability of 
exploiting the energy within the atom.
There is no doubt that we will require more energy 
as we deplete some of the natural resources used 
in our current technology, and as we recycle in order 
to extend our present resource base. But with exploit­
ation of nuclear energy we have an almost infinite 
amount of energy for those purposes and also for 
coverting currently unusable resources into our fu­
ture resource base.
The entire predictive core of the Meadows systems 
analysis founders over the fact that it has virtually, 
though not completely, ignored the essential element 
in the population-resources-pollution-industrial-food 
supply equation, namely, the energy factor. The fact 
is that we possess the scientific knowledge, the techni­
cal expertise, the capital requirements, and all the 
necessary elements required to develop energy pro­
duction for an indefinite future. Moreover, our plen- 
titude of potential power makes the arguments of 
Meadows irrelevant in the long run, which is just the 
point where his predictions are supposed to be ef­
fective.
His predictions are also irrelevant in the short run 
because he has ignored the fact that our technologi­
cal age is imbedded in a socio-cultural matrix. Al­
though The Limits to Growth does take into consi­
deration some non-technical factors, such as the psy­
chological components entering into the birth rate, it 
ignores the fact that technology functions in a socio­
cultural matrix and that we have been developing
means for social control and guidance of our technol­
ogy.
I am not really arguing against The Limits to Growth 
in stressing this point. Professor Meadows, and 
his mentor, the brilliant and respected Jay Forrester, 
claim that their purpose is to provoke and stimulate 
society to institute control over our industrial sys­
tem. I claim that the social mechanisms are al­
ready functioning, some of them in an embryonic 
stage, and that they neglect these mechanisms in 
their analysis.
As an historian of technology, I am particularly 
offended because they seem to regard technology 
as an autonomous force, completely separated from 
man and society. Technology is an integral part 
of man and society. As a product of human imagina­
tion, ingenuity, skill and expertise, it responds to 
human wants and social needs, and at the same time, 
it helps shape our wants and needs. In other words, 
it is in a very interdependent relationship with so­
ciety.
Although society has established certain institu­
tions and mechanisms for the guidance and control 
of its technology, The Limits to Growth virtually 
ignores this fact and simply assumes that technology 
functions as an independent variable without ref­
erence to social norms and institutional control. 
Indeed, one of the goals of their study is to have us a- 
dopt institutional mechanisms to control technology. 
I claim that we already have these and that we are 
developing still more. Some of the mechanisms for 
social control of our industrial base are represented 
by governmental legislation and administrative agen­
cies. Examples would be the anti-trust laws, safe­
ty laws, and laws governing the employment of 
women and minors. Nongovernmental institutions 
also exercise a certain degree of social control 
over our industrial system, labor unions being the 
obvious mechanism.
In the nongovernmental sector we have the price 
system. It is a very delicate mechanism, especially 
when coupled with the profit motive, which is the 
hallmark of our capitalist society. Indeed, some of 
the economists who have criticized The Limits to 
Growth place great reliance upon the price mecha­
nism to correct the imbalances which the MIT group 
envisages. These economists claim that as certain 
raw materials become scarce, their price will go higher, 
so that it will no longer be economic to use them— 
and hence there will be a search for replacements. 
Thus, the price system will itself suffice to delay or 
prevent altogether the exhaustion of natural resources.
While recognizing the value of the price system, 
I submit that it is not sufficient by itself to avert the 
dangerous future predicted by The Limits to Growth. 
The price system has two major defects in control­
263
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ling our technology: first, it sacrifices long-range 
interest to short-range profits; and second, these 
profits tend to benefit a few and need not necessarily 
rebound to the benefit of the community as a whole. 
We have long ago learned that what is good for 
General Motors might not be good for the rest of 
the country.
Other social controls are developing, however, and 
these do not inhibit the good features of the price 
mechanism. We are now in the process of develop­
ing social and institutional mechanisms which will 
provide effective control and guidance of our tech­
nology so that it will be used for the benefit of 
a wider group in society, preserve our natural en­
vironment, and develop the treasure which we leave 
to posterity. These new socio-political mechanisms 
go under the general heading of «Technology As­
sessment», which attempts to evaluate the social 
and human consequences of the application of science 
and technology before these are applied.
Man has always assessed the effectiveness of his 
technology, but his past assessments were confined 
to seeing if it would murder his enemies more effec­
tively or bring him greater profits. Now we are 
trying to extend this assessment to second-order 
and third-order social and human consequences.
You are already familiar with some of the man­
ifestations of this technology assessment move­
ment. They go under the headings of environment­
alism, consumerism, and accountability. For example, 
the public is beginning to demand that scientists, 
engineers, business corporations, and government 
officials be held accountable for the environmental, 
human, and social consequences of their actions. 
The passage of the Environmental Quality Control 
Act and the establishment of the Environmental 
Protection Agency are demonstrations of the pub­
lic’s concern, as is the stiffening of the Food and 
Drug Administration, and the recent discussion of 
a bill for a Consumer Protection Board. The simple 
fact is that the public is increasingly aroused by 
the spectre of damage to the ecology and environ­
ment and the public is furious about the shoddiness 
and inadequacy of the consumer products offered 
by American industry. The legislative and executive 
arms at all levels of government have been increasing­
ly responsive to this public and consumer senti­
ment; they are competing with one another to intro­
duce stronger legislation for environmental and 
consumer protection.
Although technology assessment is still in its 
infancy, Congress in the Fall of 1972 established an 
Office of Technology Assessment, thereby providing 
the beginnings of some kind of governmental mech­
anism for evaluating the social and human con­
sequences of technical applications. Scientists, en­
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gineers, and social scientists are already working 
on the problems of methodology of technology as­
sessment. We can anticipate that such assessments 
will eventually be applied to scientific discoveries 
and technical inventions before these are introduc­
ed and receive wide-spread use.
Technology assessment should reaffirm our faith 
in man and strengthen our faith in democracy. 
At a time when the Club of Rome implies that we 
have allowed technology to run amok and ruin our 
future, technology assessment insists that man is 
still in control of his destiny. Technology assess­
ment says that man can control the use of his own 
technology, that human skill imagination, and crea­
tivity can help bring man a better life, and that we 
are not the playthings of a mindless technology which 
crushes us underfoot. It means that man is master 
of his own machine, not its slave.
Technology assessment is also democratic. It 
does not mean that a group of technocrats or merit­
ocrats, or a scientific and technological elite, or 
the Club of Rome, will make decisions for us. These 
will be made by the political process, and that, 
in a democratic system, is where such decisions be­
long. Democracy allows us the privilege of making 
mistakes. Technology assessment, however, tells 
us the options open to us and their possible and prob­
able consequences.
Technology assessment is already being done on 
a fragmented and piecemeal basis in relation to 
environmental quality and drug safety. It will soon 
become a widespread and pervasive activity in A- 
merican society. As an historian, I view this as part 
of a great historical current which goes under the 
heading of «participatory democracy». Much as 
we might disapprove of some of the manifestations 
of this trend, the fact is that democracy is extending 
itself to meet the ideals set forth in our great A- 
merican Revolution. People are demanding a greater 
voice in their destinies, and since technology re­
presents an important element in our human ex­
perience, they will inevitably demand—and, in a 
truly democratic society, they will obtain—greater 
control of their technology. Technology assessment 
provides a rational means for democratic control 
and guidance.
I place great faith in technology assessment. If 
we can utilize it properly, I think that we can avoid 
the evil consequences which Meadows and his col­
leagues foresee for our industrial system. This does 
not mean that the path of the future will be smooth 
and easy. We will have to cope with environmental 
blight and ecological difficulties and social malad­
justments and resource and energy problems as 
inevitable and continuing consequences of indus­
trial advance. But it is better to cope with the prob-
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can technological progress continue to provide for the future?
Iejns than run away from them, to deal with them 
rather than ignore them. Above all, we must realize 
that these problems cannot be resolved by stopping 
all sources of change, by a moratorium on technologi­
cal innovation and the cessation of economic 
growth. Problems caused by our past use, abuse, 
and misuse of technology cannot be resolved by 
rolling backward the technological clock.
Ours is a society of so-called «high» technology. 
We may be no more happy or no more secure than 
our ancestors, but this is an exciting age in which
to live. The Limits to Growth has pointed out some 
of the dangers which might confront us. But I re­
call the dictum of Alfred North Whitehead: «It is 
the business of the future to be dangerous». We can 
accept the risks with composure and confidence if 
we do not let ourselves be frightened by false alarms 
which turn us away from growth, if we strengthen 
our science and technology to meet the challenges 
of the future, and if we carry on with the task of devel­
oping mechanisms and institutions for the control 
of our technology along socially beneficial lines.
We simply can no longer afford to hurtle blindfolded toward super-industrialism. The politics 
of technology control will trigger bitter conflict in the days to come. But conflict or no, technol­
ogy must be tamed, if the accelerative thrust is to be brought under control. And the acceler­
ative thrust must be brought under control, if future shock is to be prevented.
Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, Bantam Books, Inc., New York, 1970
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